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NOTES
State v. Bolden: LOUISIANA'S ANOMALOUS RELIANCE
ON THE ANONYMOUS INFORMANT
A police officer was told by an unidentified informant that he
recently had seen,1 in a nearby nightclub, a man with a sawed-off
shotgun in his pants. The informant and the officer, travelling to-
gether to the location, found the club closed. They met two other of-
ficers at the club, one of whom obtained a more detailed description
of the suspect from the informant. Unaccompanied by the informant,
this officer then proceeded to a nearby caf6 he knew from ex-
perience to be frequented by customers of the nightclub after clos-
ing hours. None of the officers ever determined the identity of the
informant. After waiting about five minutes, the officer observed a
man fitting the informant's description, later identified as the ap-
pellant, get out of a car parked near the cafe. The officer called for
the individual to stop, made a limited patdown of his outer
garments, and discovered a sawed-off shotgun in the exact location
described by the informant. The trial court denied the appellant's
motion to suppress the firearm and convicted him on two counts of
illegal weapons violations.2 The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction and held that an in person, anonymous3 tip to a police
officer, containing a detailed, eyewitness description of a suspect in
possession of an extremely dangerous weapon, may provide an of-
ficer reasonable cause to stop an individual meeting this description
and, for the officer's protection, to conduct a limited patdown of the
person's outer garments in search of the weapon. State v. Bolden,
380 So. 2d 40 (La. 1980).
The fourth amendment expressly protects citizens of the United
States from "unreasonable searches and seizures."4 This protection
. 1. Although the facts related in the court's summary do not reveal explicitly that
the informant told the officer the informant had seen the man with the gun, both the
majority's discussion and the petitioner's brief so indicate. State v. Bolden, 380 So. 2d
40, 42 (La. 1980). See also Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 3.
2. The appellant pleaded guilty to the possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon in violation of LA. R.S. 14:95.1 (Supp. 1975) and to the possession of an illegal
firearm in violation of LA. R.S. 40:1785 (1950).
3. Since the officers never determined the informant's identity, the majority con-
ceded that he was of no greater reliability than an anonymous informant. 380 So. 2d at
42.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
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also safeguards citizens from the same actions by their state govern-
ments.' Even such encounters as the investigatory stop and frisk,
while less intrusive than a technical arrest or a "full-blown" search,
trigger the amendment's provisions.' Sibron v. New York' states
that "[blefore an officer places a hand on the person of a citizen in
search of anything, he must have constitutionally adequate grounds
for doing so."8 In determining the reasonableness of the policeman's
actions, courts have weighed the "need to search against the inva-
sion which the search entails."9 The United States Supreme Court
has held on several occasions that unless the investigating officer
can articulate specific facts from which he inferred that the persons
whom he stopped were armed and dangerous, a protective search
for weapons is unreasonable.'"
Since its approval of the investigatory stop and frisk, the United
States Supreme Court has upheld only one such encounter based on
observations made by someone other than the investigating officer.
In that case, Adams v. Williams," the majority approved a stop
made upon information supplied to a policeman by a known inform-
ant who previously had given the officer information. 2 Conceding
that the tip did not furnish probable cause to arrest under the
Aguilar-Spinelli test," the Court concluded that the information car-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to
be seized.
5. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960).
6. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). For the purposes of this note, the terms
"investigatory stop" and "stop" refer to situations when an officer, by means of
physical force or a show of authority, in some way restrains the liberty of a citizen. Id.
at 19 n.16. For a more recent discussion of seizure of a person, see United States v.
Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 187b (1980).
7. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
8. Id. at 64.
9. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 534-35, 536-37 (1967).
10. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30
(1968).
11. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
12. Id. at 146.
13. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964), The Aguilar-Spinelli test consists of two prongs which must be met to establish
probable cause: (1) The officer must show that the informant has been reliable in the
past; and (2) the officer must demonstrate that the informant obtained his information
from a reliable source. Although Justice Rehnquist does not state expressly why the
information does not meet the test in Adams, a close analysis indicates that the in-
formant was of dubious past reliability and that the informant did not indicate the
source of his information to the police officer.
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ried indicia of reliability sufficient to justify a forcible stop of the
suspect.14 However, the opinion declares that some information re-
ceived by an officer either would warrant no police response or
would require further investigation to justify a forcible stop of the
suspect.'"
No Supreme Court decision deals with the issue of the instant
case, i.e., whether a police officer may stop an individual who simply
matches an anonymous informant's description of a suspect allegedly
armed with a dangerous weapon, although the officer does not ob-
serve the individual's engaging in any suspicious behavior. However,
several state 6 and federal" appellate courts have confronted directly
this question and reached conflicting conclusions. In United States v.
McLeroy,"8 the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals inval-
idated a stop for the investigation of possession of a sawed-off
shotgun made upon an officer's corroboration only of a description
available to the general public. The court stated, "[rleasonable suspi-
cion requires more than this minimal corroboration of innocent
details." 9 However, in the most recent state case, People v. Tooks, °
a sharply divided Michigan Supreme Court upheld a stop based on
facts strikingly similar to those in Bolden.
Stop and frisk analyses in courts other than Louisiana's to date
have applied only the fourth amendment's prohibition against unrea-
14. 407 U.S. at 147-48.
15. Id. at 147. Justice Rehnquist intimated that an anonymous telephone call
would fall into this category. Id.
16. Only four state courts actually have considered whether a person may be stopped
when he simply matches an anonymous informant's description and an exigency does
not exist. Three states have allowed investigatory stops on such information. People v.
Tooks, 403 Mich. 568, 271 N.W.2d 503 (1978); State ex. rel. H.B., 75 N.J. 243, 381 A.2d
759 (1977); People v. Kinlock, 43 N.Y.2d 832, 373 N.E.2d 372 (1977). One state has re-
jected expressly the notion that an anonymous informant may justify an investigatory
stop. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 342 A.2d 1298 (Pa. 1978). The appeals court for the
District of Columbia has allowed a stop based on information supplied in person by an
individual who refused to identify himself. United States v. Walker, 294 A.2d 376 (D.C.
1972).
17. The fourth and fifth circuits have reached opposite conclusions. Compare
United States v. McLeroy, 584 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1978) (the stop is unjustified) with
United States v. Gorin, 564 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1977) (the stop is valid). In State v. Jer-
nigan, 377 So. 2d 1222, 1225 (La. 1979), the Louisiana Supreme Court cited three cases
that are easily distinguished from both Jernigan and the instant case, Bolden. United
States v. Hernandez, 486 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1973) (source was determined); United
States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973) (suspect behaved suspiciously before the
stop); United States v. Unverzagt, 424 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1970) (anonymous informant
and another informant whose identity was determined).
18. 584 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1978).
19. Id. at 748.
20. 403 Mich. 568, 271 N.W.2d 503 (1978).
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sonable searches and seizures. However, the Louisiana Constitution
provides an additional guarantee, the protection against unrea-
sonable "invasions of privacy,'" On several occasions the Louisiana
Supreme Court has held that the state constitutional prohibition im-
poses a standard, higher than that of the Federal Constitution,
which must be met before a Louisiana police officer may detain an
individual." In State v. Kinneman,3 the court concluded that this
higher standard required that "probable'cause" be established be-
fore an investigatory stop is made:
Should there be any doubt that the right of the police to force-
fully stop and search others is circumscribed by the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, there can be
none that the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, by the inclusion of
the words "invasions of privacy" meant to extend the "probable
cause" requirement to protect that right as well as the right to
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.
In a later decision, State v. Wilson," Justice Tate declared that the
protections afforded by the Louisiana Constitution require that
before a stop be made on a known informant's tip, the informant and
his information must withstand the rigors of the Aguilar-Spinelli
test for reliability," a higher requirement than that set by the
United States Supreme Court.27
21. LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 provides:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of
privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons or
things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any person
adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this section
shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
22. Compare State v. Washington, 364 So. 2d 958 (La. 1978) (suspect's fitting the
"Detroit profile" held not to justify police action) with United States v. Mendenhall,
100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980) (fitting the "Detroit profile" may justify some police action). The
"Detroit profile" consists of a list of characteristics, including arrival from a source city,
travelling alone, sitting in the back of the plane, and carrying no luggage, which are
thought to be attributes of illegal drug couriers.
23. 337 So. 2d 441 (La. 1976).
24. Id. at 443-44.
25. 366 So. 2d 1328 (La. 1978). "An unverified and undifferentiated tip derived
from an undisclosed source cannot supply the reasonable cause to justify an intrusion
upon a person's liberty, whether that intrusion is characterized as an arrest or as an
investigatory stop." Id. at 1333.
26. "[Tlhe same criteria of trustworthiness required for the showing of the
greater degree of probability of criminal conduct [is] necessary to justify an arrest." Id.
at 1332.
27. In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972), Justice Rehnquist stated that
the information received by the officer, while probably insufficient under the Aguilar-
[Vol. 41
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Subsequently, in State v. Brown28 the Louisiana Supreme Court
allowed a stop based upon a detailed description provided by an un-
known informant. Justice Tate, again writing for the majority, relied
on language in Spinelli v. United States29 and concluded that
because the officer observed the suspect engaged in behavior sug-
gestive of the crime alleged" and because the detailed information
fit only one person in the location named by the informant, the
detention was justified."
Less than one month before announcing the Bolden decision, in
State v. Jernigan" the Louisiana Supreme Court went beyond the
position that an anonymous informant can furnish reasonable cause
only after a police officer observes the suspect engaging in suspi-
cious behavior. In Jernigan an anonymous caller alleged that a par-
ticularly dressed individual was carrying a firearm in a specified
bar. The investigating officer immediately went to the bar and ob-
served only one person matching the description. The officer frisked
this individual and discovered a handgun. The state supreme court
emphasized that a gun in an occupied alcoholic beverage outlet
presents an immediate danger to the public and held that the police-
man's actions were reasonable." Although the United States
Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari,34 Justice White, joined
by two other Justices in an unusual dissent from the denial,35
declared that Jernigan was "arguably . . .inconsistent"3 with prior
opinions of the Court.
In the instant case, State v. Bolden, the Louisiana Supreme
Court, broadening the holdings of Brown and Jernigan, allowed
Spinelli test, still carried enough indicia of reliability to justify an investigatory stop.
The higher standard of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights is not limited just to
the investigatory stop and frisk aspect of criminal justice administration. Compare LA.
CONST. art. I, § 5 with Rakas v. Illinois, 438 U.S. 128 (1978). Compare LA. CONST. art. I,
§ 13 with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Compare LA. CONST. art. I, § 20
with U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louis-
iana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REv. 1 (1974).
28. 370 So. 2d 547 (La. 1979).
29. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
30. In Brown, the suspect's behavior conformed to the "Detroit profile." See note
22, supra. But see State v. Matthews, 366 So. 2d 1348 (La. 1978) (a vague description
will not justify an airport search even though the suspect's behavior fits the "Detroit
profile"); State v. Washington, 364 So. 2d 958 (La. 1978) (simply matching the "Detroit
profile" is not enough to justify a stop in Louisiana).
31. 370 So. 2d 547, 551 (La. 1979).
32. 377 So. 2d 1222 (La. 1979).
33. Id. at 1225.
34. Jernigan v. Louisiana, 100 S. Ct. at 2930 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2931.
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police officers to stop an individual on a public sidewalk, although he
had made no furtive gestures before the encounter but simply
matched an anonymous informant's description. Without discussing
the right to privacy vouchsafed by the Louisiana Constitution, the
court applied federal and state constitutional prohibitions against
unreasonable searches as the sole standards for evaluating the
police officer's actions.37 Jurisprudence clearly indicates that the
legitimacy of any stop and frisk is determined by constitutional
limitations." However, the United States Supreme Court's applica-
tion of the fourth amendment39 is supplemented in Louisiana by the
right to privacy clause of article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Consti-
tution." And a careful consideration of both provisions, as well as of
the spirits underlying them, should have led the Bolden court to in-
validate the stop.
The judiciary is exposed to an investigatory stop and frisk only
after the search has occurred.4' For this reason, to maintain a check
on the police officer's actions, the United States Supreme Court has
determined that a stop is justified (and, therefore, may yield ad-
missible evidence) only if judicial review indicates that a reasonable
man would have concluded that the person with whom the officer
dealt was armed and dangerous. 2 The Court has approved stops only
when the officer acted upon either his own observations43 or upon
the observations of a person known to the officer." In these situa-
tions, a court possesses the ability to examine closely the facts
available to the officer in order to determine the reasonableness of
his actions. However, police response to an anonymous informant's
tip, as in Bolden, thwarts judicial scrutiny. A court evaluating such
action is forced to rely solely upon the officer's testimony as to the
nature and content of the tip.45 Sanctioning action based upon an
37. 380 So. 2d at 41-42; But see LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (the right to be free from
unreasonable invasions of privacy). See note 21, supra, for the constitutional text.
38. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
State v. Wilson, 366 So. 2d 1328 (La. 1978).
39. See note 4, supra.
40. See note 21, supra.
41. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1968).
4. Id. at 21-22.
43. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
44. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
45. For a discussion of the effect on the burden of proof when a trial court relies
solely upon an officer's testimony, see Comment, In Re H.B.: An Unfortunate Expan-
sion of the Power to Stop and Frisk, 32 RUT. L. REV. 118, 138 (1979).
Reliance on an untested source presents myriad problems. Bolden raises the
possibility that a police officer might, acting upon information supplied by a lying or
vindictive informant, frisk innocent citizens. In the volatile areas where investigatory
stops generally take place, such "harassment" could prove particularly unfortunate.
[Vol. 41
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anonymous informant's tip upsets the delicate balance between pro-
tecting the policeman and prohibiting unwarranted stops. For exam-
ple, under the facts of Bolden, an officer might frisk a citizen and, if
a weapon were found, "manufacture" an anonymous tipster.
As Justice Dennis's dissent pointedly notes, Bolden not only con-
flicts with the spirit of Adams v. Williams," but also is flatly incon-
sistent with the law as described by Justice Rehnquist in Adams, in
which "[tihe central reason" that the frisk was justified was "'that
the informant was known to the officer personally and had provided
him with information in the past."'" 7 Adams expressly approves an
investigatory stop on an unverified tip in only two situations-when
a victim reports a street crime and when a credible informant warns
of a specific impending crime."
In addition, the Bolden majority failed to consider previous opin-
ions of the Louisiana Supreme Court that discussed the state con-
stitutional right to privacy and the protections it affords. While
earlier opinions indicate that the privacy clause severely restricts
the situations in which Louisiana's police officers may make an in-
vestigatory stop,'9 Bolden approved a stop based upon information
supplied by an untested, unknown source who could not testify at
trial. The court offers no explanation for the failure of the officers to
determine the informant's identity, an omission particularly prob-
lematic since both federal and state court opinions decry reliance on
an unidentified source. °
The reasoning in Bolden suggests that three important con-
siderations determined the result. First, the court noted that the in-
formant made his tip in person.5 ' Certainly other courts faced with
similar facts have given greater weight to in person anonymous tips
than to anonymous telephone calls. 2 Since the Bolden patdown oc-
curred in non-exigent circumstances, a requirement that the infor-
mation be derived from the more reliable of the two types of anon-
ymous tips is not unreasonable.
For a discussion of the lying informant, see Comment, The Undisclosed Informant and
the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Meaningful Standards, 81 YALE L.J. 703, 718
(1972).
46. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
47. 380 So. 2d at 43 (Dennis, J., dissenting), quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 146 (1972).
48. 407 U.S. at 147.
49. See, e.g., State v. Kinneman, 337 So. 2d 441 (La. 1976). See text at note 26,
supra. See generally State v. Wilson, 366 So. 2d 1328 (La. 1978).
50. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); State v. Wilson, 366
So. 2d 1328 (La. 1978).
51. 380 So. 2d at 41.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 294 A.2d 376 (D.C. 1972).
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Second, the Bolden majority was persuaded by the detail of the
informant's eyewitness report.53 A tip from an eyewitness satisfies
the reliability-of-information prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test54 and
should reduce the likelihood of unwarranted intrusions upon the per-
sons of innocent citizens.
Third, the majority obviously was persuaded by the involvement
of an extremely dangerous weapon, presenting a high risk to the of-
ficer or the public.5 The court emphasized that possession of a
sawed-off shotgun creates an "acute public interest in swift police
action."" Since, as Justice Rehnquist wrote in Adams v. Williams,
"[tihe purpose for this limited search [an investigatory stop and
frisk] is not to discover evidence of crime," 7 low-risk offenses, such
as the possession of narcotics or even of some weapons, would not
come within the Bolden rationale. Because a frisk on a city sidewalk
is a significant intrusion upon individual liberty, the existence of a
"need for immediate action"5 has been required to justify the
search.
The constitutions of the United States and of Louisiana charge
the judiciary with the duty of maintaining the tenuous balance be-
tween protecting police officers and safeguarding individual rights.
Unfortunately, Bolden may protect police safety at the expense of
individual liberty. Frisks based upon information supplied by a vin-
dictive informant, a lying informant, or even a "manufactured" in-
formant are foreseeable under the reasoning of the instant case. The
potential for such unwarranted government activity suggests that
State v. Bolden should remain limited; extension of its rationale or
further elevation of the anonymous informant's role could impair
severely "the right to be let alone,"59 a right the Louisiana Supreme
Court has considered an interest of utmost importance to a free
society. °
Harlin DeWayne Hale
53. 380 So. 2d at 42.
54. Prong two, the ultimate source of the informant's tip, is met when an
eyewitness reports a crime.
55. 380 So. 2d at 42.
56. Id.
57. 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
58. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. at 73 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
59. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
60. State v. Saia, 302 So. 2d 869 (La. 1974).
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